The Bodo & Ulfa Problem

Bhutan Bodo & Ulfa Conflict Chimis from all 20 dzongkhags expressed their concernJuly 2002

July 04 , 2002

Chimis from all 20 dzongkhags wanted to know the results of the agreement between the royal government and the ULFA leaders last year. If the militants had kept their word, it would indicate the wisdom of the strategy. But if the ULFA had not closed down the four camps as agreed and reduced their strength the time for peaceful negotiations was over.

The Dagana chimi said that 10 fully armed ULFA militants had entered Dagana through the jungles of Sarpang and Tsirang between February 18 and 22, 2002, followed by groups of four and 16 militants a few weeks later.

The security forces at Dagapela had protected the people, but it meant that the militants had betrayed the written agreement with the government. The Tsirang chimi also reported the presence of armed militants on February 16 and April 29.

The public of Khamoe geog in Gasa suggested that, in the event of a military action, the government of India should not stop the militants from crossing the border back into India. The Chukha dzongda, Dasho Zangley Dukpa, and the BCCI chimi felt that the strict vigilance by the Indian forces at the border had stopped the militants from leaving Bhutan. The public of Trashigang said that, despite the checking of all vehicles passing through check-points the militants were able to get food and other supplies without much problem.

The kingdom's business community expressed concern that the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) and Bodo militants have been seen moving in areas under Chukha dzongkhag. "If this is true, we are concerned that it might pose a serious threat to the national power projects and the business community at large," the BCCI chimi said.

The Paro chimi said that Bhutan could never be sure whether the militants had closed the camps or just merged them with others.

The Zhemgang chimi added that, while Bhutanese vehicles had been attacked and innocent travelers killed, there had not been a single militant attack on buses operated on the same route by Indian operators although there were many Bhutanese travelers using these buses. At the same time the people of Zhemgang going across the border into Assam were regularly harassed. While Bhutan had always considered India a friend, it was time to question India's role in all this, he said.

The Haa chimi said that it had become embarrassing that, after years of discussion in the National Assembly, there was no solution to the militant problem.

The people of Samdrup Jonkhar submitted that the security of the country and the lives of the people would continue to be affected until all the camps, not just four of them, were closed.

The Samdrup Jongkhar dzongda, Dasho Penden Wangchuk, agreed that the people of Samdrup Jongkhar were particularly affected by the continued presence of the militants.
According to the National Assembly resolution and government directives, a strict control was maintained on the sale and movment of supplies and rations within Bhutan. All the shops in Nganglam and Bhangtar were closed and villagers were not allowed to keep any livestock. But, because of the long and porous border between Bhutan and Assam, it had been difficult to fully stop the supply of food and other materials to the militants from across the border. Despite the deployment of thousands of security personnel by the Indian government it was difficult to fully control the infiltration and the supply of food and materials from Assam. The dzongda informed the Assembly that, on the instructions of the government, he had inspected the ULFA camp at Deori in Orong geog on December 31, 2001. There were 64 sheds which were destroyed by the security personnel from Deothang. The other camp, at Martshala, which was the ULFA military training centre, was inspected on the same day by the dungpa of Bhangtar. This camp was also dismantled and burnt by the security personnel. As there was no list of the number of militants it was difficult to assess whether the strength of the ULFA militants in Bhutan had reduced or not.

The Wangduephodrang chimi said that the National Assembly had held many discussions on the problem posed by the ULFA and Bodo militants. With the third militant outfit, the KLO, inside the country, it was time for a concrete decision.

The Punakha chimi said that the agreement with the ULFA was not a failure because it had at least resulted in the dismantling of four camps and such measures should be pursued.

The Bumthang chimi said the removal of four camps was an improvement over the past situation but it still did not remove the security threat to the country. The problem was more serious now with the emergence of the KLO.

The people of Ngangla, Bjokha, Goshing, Phangkhar, and Trong geogs in Zhemgang proposed that the villagers in the high-risk areas should be relocated to safer places and the bridges frequently used by the militants should be dismantled immediately to restrict their movement. They said that the dismantling of the Yangmari, Chengazam, and Panbang bridges would stop the movement of the militants. "The presence of the ULFA and BODO militants being a perpetual threat to our country there are very limited options for us," said the Zhemgang chimi. "The people of Zhemgang feel that, if we are to solve this problem, it will be useful if these bridges are dismantled, thereby blocking the main routes used by the militants. Although the dismantling of the bridges will impose great hardship and difficulties for many villages under Zhemgang, we believe that it would be a small sacrifice for a greater purpose."

Dozin Chunjur Dorji of the Royal Bhutan Army said that the dismantling of the bridges would greatly improve the security of the area. It would prevent the militants from moving deeper into Bhutan, and thereby reduce the security threat to the people. It would also not be necessary for the security forces to guard these bridges.

The chimis of Thimphu, Chukha, and Haa expressed their concern over the continued presence of militants. It was the ULFA who had first infiltrated into Bhutan. Then it was the Bodos. Now it was the KLO. Next year it might be another group. "It has raised a lot of suspicion in our people," the Chukha chimi said. "They get ration and other sustenance from across the border in Assam and West Bengal. How do they manage to get all these ? What kind of support do they really have ? These issues need to be discussed with the government of India. If we cannot depend on the friend in the south it may be necessary to also look for support in the north."

The BCCI chimi said that the government had followed the four-point resolution and the removal of the four ULFA camps was an achievement. The establishment of new camps and the infiltration by the new group, however, was a cause for serious concern. The Indian security personnel, with their large numbers along the border, could easily seal the border and, if they did this, the militants would no longer be here in Bhutan. The chimi pointed out that the establishment of camps by the KLO militants in the western part of the country had now militarised the entire border. Now, more than ever, it was imperative that Indian security forces adopt effective and appropriate measures to stop militants infiltrating into Bhutanese territory.